Agency : Sharon Krause

The concept of agency is a fundamental one in political theory because agency is crucial to the coordinated activity that is a constitutive component of political life. Agency is especially central in theories of democratic politics because it is a precondition for collective self-rule, political contestation, and the pursuit of justice. As a political concept. . .

Agency : Sharon Krause

The concept of agency is a fundamental one in political theory because agency is crucial to the coordinated activity that is a constitutive component of political life. Agency is especially central in theories of democratic politics because it is a precondition for collective self-rule, political contestation, and the pursuit of justice. As a political concept. . .

Animals : Alice Crary

The last half-century has witnessed a striking upsurge in interest concerning questions about animals, ethics and politics. Yet philosophers and animal advocates have been surprisingly reluctant to treat the bare fact that a creature is an animal as morally significant. This article traces some of the most prominent attempts to think about animals as proper objects of. . .

Animals : Alice Crary

The last half-century has witnessed a striking upsurge in interest concerning questions about animals, ethics and politics. Yet philosophers and animal advocates have been surprisingly reluctant to treat the bare fact that a creature is an animal as morally significant. This article traces some of the most prominent attempts to think about animals as proper objects of. . .

Anticipation : Gary Wilder

Theodor Adorno famously concluded Minima Moralia with the cryptic suggestion that “the only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things from the standpoint of redemption . . . Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as. . .

Anticipation : Gary Wilder

Theodor Adorno famously concluded Minima Moralia with the cryptic suggestion that “the only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things from the standpoint of redemption . . . Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as. . .

Archē : Stathis Gourgouris

I can say, perhaps a little playfully but not altogether inaccurately, that I’ve chosen to engage with the very first political concept—certainly in name, if nothing else. But as you will see my reading is precisely to demonstrate how, from its initial invocation (from its archē, as it were), this concept renders any notions of the first or of the one impossible, indeterminable, an-archic.

Archē : Stathis Gourgouris

I can say, perhaps a little playfully but not altogether inaccurately, that I’ve chosen to engage with the very first political concept—certainly in name, if nothing else. But as you will see my reading is precisely to demonstrate how, from its initial invocation (from its archē, as it were), this concept renders any notions of the first or of the one impossible, indeterminable, an-archic.

Archive : Ariella Azoulay

For the past two decades, the Hegelian concept Aufhebung keeps appearing in the elaborate literature written on the subject of archives. It describes archival work. Here is a late, characteristic example of this approach: “To archive is to put away, to shelter, to keep . . . The modality of Aufhebung, conventionally translated into English as ‘sublation’. . .

Archive : Ariella Azoulay

For the past two decades, the Hegelian concept Aufhebung keeps appearing in the elaborate literature written on the subject of archives. It describes archival work. Here is a late, characteristic example of this approach: “To archive is to put away, to shelter, to keep . . . The modality of Aufhebung, conventionally translated into English as ‘sublation’. . .

Authority : Avital Ronell

Neither powered up by a solid sense of (or even desire for) legitimacy, nor a control freak with regard to the possibilities of comprehension, I abide with the weaker neighborhoods of thought, where things do not always work out or offer the narcissistic comfort of landing in the vicinity of secured sense. This time, in order to get a running start on the motif. . .

Authority : Avital Ronell

Neither powered up by a solid sense of (or even desire for) legitimacy, nor a control freak with regard to the possibilities of comprehension, I abide with the weaker neighborhoods of thought, where things do not always work out or offer the narcissistic comfort of landing in the vicinity of secured sense. This time, in order to get a running start on the motif. . .

Blood : Gil Anidjar

The inclusion of blood in a lexicon of political concepts would seem to require the removal of two quite formidable obstacles. First, blood is not a concept. And second, blood is not political. I shall return to the first obstacle, but I should begin by deferring to understandable reservations with regards to the removal of the second. For who. . .

Blood : Gil Anidjar

The inclusion of blood in a lexicon of political concepts would seem to require the removal of two quite formidable obstacles. First, blood is not a concept. And second, blood is not political. I shall return to the first obstacle, but I should begin by deferring to understandable reservations with regards to the removal of the second. For who. . .

Bubble : Anat Biletzki

Is “bubble” a concept, except in the trivial sense in which every word ensconced in quotes becomes a concept, or rather a “concept”? More pertinently, is it a political concept? Is the philosophical exercise of making it a political concept a legitimate exercise, or, does such an exercise run the professional risk of philosophical facetiousness?

Bubble : Anat Biletzki

Is “bubble” a concept, except in the trivial sense in which every word ensconced in quotes becomes a concept, or rather a “concept”? More pertinently, is it a political concept? Is the philosophical exercise of making it a political concept a legitimate exercise, or, does such an exercise run the professional risk of philosophical facetiousness?

Civilization : Susan Buck-Morss

I do not like the formulation of the question: What is Civilization? It calls for a definition of the concept, a list of its descriptive determinations. Or, it evokes a well-known critical move: the announcement that civilization is constructed, followed by a genealogy of how, historically, such a construction occurred and whose interests were thereby served. . .

Civilization : Susan Buck-Morss

I do not like the formulation of the question: What is Civilization? It calls for a definition of the concept, a list of its descriptive determinations. Or, it evokes a well-known critical move: the announcement that civilization is constructed, followed by a genealogy of how, historically, such a construction occurred and whose interests were thereby served. . .

Comedy : Dmitri Nikulin

When we are engaged in a commonly shared and recognized activity that follows certain implicit or explicit rules and pursues particular ends, we do not always notice these rules and ends. Yet, reflecting on them might be important, since it would allow us to better understand the legitimacy and presuppositions of our actions, interactions, and strivings, and . . .

Comedy : Dmitri Nikulin

When we are engaged in a commonly shared and recognized activity that follows certain implicit or explicit rules and pursues particular ends, we do not always notice these rules and ends. Yet, reflecting on them might be important, since it would allow us to better understand the legitimacy and presuppositions of our actions, interactions, and strivings, and . . .

Concept II : Adi Ophir

Concepts are not terms. The distinction between the two should be maintained and its articulation should be part of any attempt to answer the question ‘what is a concept?’ The distinction should be articulated even if one conceives concepts to be terms of a special kind; without it concepts would be reduced to the status of grammatical entities, a class of . . .

Concept II : Adi Ophir

Concepts are not terms. The distinction between the two should be maintained and its articulation should be part of any attempt to answer the question ‘what is a concept?’ The distinction should be articulated even if one conceives concepts to be terms of a special kind; without it concepts would be reduced to the status of grammatical entities, a class of . . .

Consent : James Miller

The verb consent came into English from an Old French verb (consenter) that itself was derived from the Latin verb consentio (to share in feeling), which is part of a family of Latin terms that includes the nouns consensio (agreement, harmony) and consensus (unanimity, concord). The English verb occurs as early as the twelfth century, in the sense of voluntarily acceding . . .

Consent : James Miller

The verb consent came into English from an Old French verb (consenter) that itself was derived from the Latin verb consentio (to share in feeling), which is part of a family of Latin terms that includes the nouns consensio (agreement, harmony) and consensus (unanimity, concord). The English verb occurs as early as the twelfth century, in the sense of voluntarily acceding . . .

Conspiracy : James Martel

Conspiracy is a concept much maligned by political theorists in the western tradition. It is generally regarded as an attempt by a self appointed group of collaborators to illicitly subvert existing forms of politics by secret actions. Many western thinkers are on record for denouncing and defying conspiracies. Cicero is famous for his attacks on and . . .

Conspiracy : James Martel

Conspiracy is a concept much maligned by political theorists in the western tradition. It is generally regarded as an attempt by a self appointed group of collaborators to illicitly subvert existing forms of politics by secret actions. Many western thinkers are on record for denouncing and defying conspiracies. Cicero is famous for his attacks on and . . .

Constituent Power : A. Kalyvas

Constituent power is the truth of modern democracy. For two main reasons, a historical and an analytical one. First, the birth of the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty coincides with the conceptual advent of constituent power. They are co-original and coeval. The political supremacy of the multitude over princes, kings, emperors, and. . .

Constituent Power : A. Kalyvas

Constituent power is the truth of modern democracy. For two main reasons, a historical and an analytical one. First, the birth of the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty coincides with the conceptual advent of constituent power. They are co-original and coeval. The political supremacy of the multitude over princes, kings, emperors, and. . .

Demonization : Nathaniel Berman

One of the most powerful tactics in current political debates is to accuse one’s opponent of “demonizing” the target of his or her critique. The charge almost always forces the other on the defensive – ranging from the petulant (“I wasn’t demonizing, I was just making specific criticisms”) to the childish (“I’m the one who’s demonizing?! You’re the one who’s . . .

Demonization : Nathaniel Berman

One of the most powerful tactics in current political debates is to accuse one’s opponent of “demonizing” the target of his or her critique. The charge almost always forces the other on the defensive – ranging from the petulant (“I wasn’t demonizing, I was just making specific criticisms”) to the childish (“I’m the one who’s demonizing?! You’re the one who’s . . .

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