Author Archives: alexis.dianda


Hegemony : Brian Meeks

I have been thinking about hegemony in the Caribbean for more than two decades, utilizing the Gramscian notion that social formations are structured in dominance, but that domination is often not primarily executed through force; rather, the social bloc in charge is able to produce and reproduce discourses and sets of ideas that give structure and shape to its apparent . . .


Hegemony : Brian Meeks

I have been thinking about hegemony in the Caribbean for more than two decades, utilizing the Gramscian notion that social formations are structured in dominance, but that domination is often not primarily executed through force; rather, the social bloc in charge is able to produce and reproduce discourses and sets of ideas that give structure and shape to its apparent . . .


Identity : Akeel Bilgrami

It is doubtful that the concept of identity is susceptible to a substantial philosophical treatment at a high level of generality. This is so not so much because there are too many disparate theories of identity, but more because the sorts of things, the question of whose identity are taken up by philosophers, are too disparate to get a uniform treatment. Broadly speaking. . .


Identity : Akeel Bilgrami

It is doubtful that the concept of identity is susceptible to a substantial philosophical treatment at a high level of generality. This is so not so much because there are too many disparate theories of identity, but more because the sorts of things, the question of whose identity are taken up by philosophers, are too disparate to get a uniform treatment. Broadly speaking. . .


Impunity : Zahid R. Chaudhary

On January 23, 2016 Trump declaimed at a rally in Sioux Center, Iowa: “I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose voters.” The statement—perhaps exaggerated and perhaps not—is outside the bounds of true and false because it is a performative, enacting, among other things, a masculinist will to power, one that anticipates . . .


Impunity : Zahid R. Chaudhary

On January 23, 2016 Trump declaimed at a rally in Sioux Center, Iowa: “I could stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn’t lose voters.” The statement—perhaps exaggerated and perhaps not—is outside the bounds of true and false because it is a performative, enacting, among other things, a masculinist will to power, one that anticipates . . .


Interior Frontiers : Ann Laura Stoler

This moment in which I write is one for which we should have been prepared: Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders are no longer on distant dark horizons: they are dead center in forging the political cleavages of our times. They are singular crusaders but they are not alone. They operate through racialized distinctions and fears to which we might have . . .


Interior Frontiers : Ann Laura Stoler

This moment in which I write is one for which we should have been prepared: Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, and Geert Wilders are no longer on distant dark horizons: they are dead center in forging the political cleavages of our times. They are singular crusaders but they are not alone. They operate through racialized distinctions and fears to which we might have . . .


Materialism : Patrice Maniglier

The concept I have chosen is not just one political concept among others; it is the concept of the politicality of concepts in general. This concept is materialism. Some might object that it is not a political but rather a metaphysical concept, and even that it is not a concept at all, but rather a doctrine, that is a system of concepts, or maybe just an Idea or an . . .


Materialism : Patrice Maniglier

The concept I have chosen is not just one political concept among others; it is the concept of the politicality of concepts in general. This concept is materialism. Some might object that it is not a political but rather a metaphysical concept, and even that it is not a concept at all, but rather a doctrine, that is a system of concepts, or maybe just an Idea or an . . .


Parasite : Anders M. Gullestad

From holy to base and comic, and then to degenerate and utterly worthless, fit for nothing but extinction: few examples show the extreme flexibility, adaptability, and changing fortunes of concepts as well as that of the parasite. What’s more, this strange historical trajectory has turned the parasite into a key term for understanding the exclusionary. . .


Parasite : Anders M. Gullestad

From holy to base and comic, and then to degenerate and utterly worthless, fit for nothing but extinction: few examples show the extreme flexibility, adaptability, and changing fortunes of concepts as well as that of the parasite. What’s more, this strange historical trajectory has turned the parasite into a key term for understanding the exclusionary. . .


The Political : Adi Ophir

Half way through his argument in “The Proposition of Equaliberty,” precisely in the middle of the text, Balibar writes: “There will be a permanent tension between the conditions that historically determine the construction of institutions that conform to the proposition of equaliberty and the excessive, hyperbolic universality of the statement. Nevertheless, . . .


The Political : Adi Ophir

Half way through his argument in “The Proposition of Equaliberty,” precisely in the middle of the text, Balibar writes: “There will be a permanent tension between the conditions that historically determine the construction of institutions that conform to the proposition of equaliberty and the excessive, hyperbolic universality of the statement. Nevertheless, . . .


Punishment : Didier Fassin

Is punishment a political concept? Indeed, as a concept, it has been mostly discussed by moral philosophers and legal theorists, who have defended the importance of distinguishing between definition (supposedly value-neutral) and justification (definitely value-laden), between the institution in general (viewed as justified) and the act . . .


Punishment : Didier Fassin

Is punishment a political concept? Indeed, as a concept, it has been mostly discussed by moral philosophers and legal theorists, who have defended the importance of distinguishing between definition (supposedly value-neutral) and justification (definitely value-laden), between the institution in general (viewed as justified) and the act . . .


Reading : John Cayley

The President does not read. This statement, my own, is derived from two articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times that were published before and after the 2016 election, respectively. I might have quoted something like it, out of context, from the title of the Washington Post article, but Trump was not yet president and I would have been pointedly . . .


Reading : John Cayley

The President does not read. This statement, my own, is derived from two articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times that were published before and after the 2016 election, respectively. I might have quoted something like it, out of context, from the title of the Washington Post article, but Trump was not yet president and I would have been pointedly . . .


Rights : J.M. Bernstein

Étienne Balibar’s political philosophy innovates a complex constellation of concepts aimed at reviving and renewing the great tradition of radical democracy. Equaliberty, citizenship, intensive universality, civility, constituent power, structural violence, insurrection and transformation, and the democratizing of democracy are all plausible candidates for concepts . . .


Rights : J.M. Bernstein

Étienne Balibar’s political philosophy innovates a complex constellation of concepts aimed at reviving and renewing the great tradition of radical democracy. Equaliberty, citizenship, intensive universality, civility, constituent power, structural violence, insurrection and transformation, and the democratizing of democracy are all plausible candidates for concepts . . .


Torture : J.M. Bernstein

“For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering. . .


Torture : J.M. Bernstein

“For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering. . .


Trump : Joan Wallach Scott

Is “trump” a political concept in the sense that Adi Ophir has defined it?—as a “unit of mental representation,” a linguistic performance that “tries to explain, to present and to express the essence of what the concept refers to.” Is it, pace Koselleck, more than a word? He writes, “In use a word can be unambiguous. By contrast, a concept must remain ambiguous in order . . .


Trump : Joan Wallach Scott

Is “trump” a political concept in the sense that Adi Ophir has defined it?—as a “unit of mental representation,” a linguistic performance that “tries to explain, to present and to express the essence of what the concept refers to.” Is it, pace Koselleck, more than a word? He writes, “In use a word can be unambiguous. By contrast, a concept must remain ambiguous in order . . .